We study combinatorial procurement auctions, where a buyer with a valuation function v and budget B wishes to buy a set of items. Each item i has a cost c i and the buyer is interested in a set S that maximizes v(S) subject to Σ i∈S c i ≤ B. Special cases of combinatorial procurement auctions are well-studied problems from submodular optimization. In particular, when the costs are all equal (cardinality constraint), a classic result by Nemhauser et al shows that the greedy algorithm provides an e e−1 approximation. Motivated by many papers that utilize demand queries to elicit the preferences of agents in economic settings, we develop algorithms that guarantee improved approximation ratios in the presence of demand oracles. We are able to break the for maximization subject to a cardinality constraint.
INTRODUCTION
We study the following combinatorial procurement auction problem: a buyer with a valuation v and budget B wishes to purchase a set of items S, where each item i has a cost c i . The buyer is interested in maximizing his value v(S) while not overspending (Σ i∈S c i ≤ B).
Truthful mechanisms for various variations of this problem were studied in [Singer 2010 ] and its followups Chen et al. 2011] . In this paper we study the problem from a pure combinatorial optimization point of view 1 . This is analogous to the combinatorial auctions literature, where one branch studies incentives issues (e.g., Lavi and Swamy 2005; Dobzinski 2011; Bartal et al. 2003 ]), and the other studies the problem as a pure combinatorial optimization problem ignoring incentives (e.g., [Lehmann et al. 2001; Khot et al. 2005; Vondrák 2008; Dobzinski et al. 2005; Feige 2006; Feige and Vondrák 2006; ).
We focus on cases where the valuation function v is submodular (for each two sets S and T , v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )) or subadditive (for each two sets S and T , v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ))
. Submodular valuations capture settings where the buyer exhibits decreasing marginal utilities, and subadditive valuations capture complement freeness. See, e.g., [Lehmann et al. 2001] , for a more elaborate discussion.
When v is submodular a combinatorial procurement auction is a reformulation of a classical problem from submodular optimization, maximization subject to a knapsack constraint: each item i has a cost c i and the goal is to find a maximum-value set S such that Σ i∈S c i ≤ B, for a given budget B. A special case is maximization subject to a cardinality constraint: find a set S of size k with the highest value. Many other generalizations and variants of this problem were studied (e.g., [Fisher et al. 1978; Khuller et al. 1999; Sviridenko 2004; Vondrák 2008; Kulik et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2009; Kulik et al. 2011; Chekuri et al. 2011] ).
We want our algorithms to run in time polynomial in n, the number of items. However, the valuation function is an object of size 2 m . The combinatorial auctions literature therefore usually assumes that access to the valuation is done via an oracle. Two types of queries were extensively studied: value queries (given a set S, return v(S)) and demand queries (given prices p 1 , . . . , p m return a set S such that S ∈ arg max T v(T ) − Σ j∈T p j ). Here we use demand queries to design combinatorial procurement auctions. In this context, demand queries were already used in ], but let us mention two justifications: -Economic interpretation: many algorithms for economic settings, either truthful or not truthful, assume that the valuations are accessed via demand oracles (e.g., [Feige and Vondrák 2006; Feige 2006; Dobzinski et al. 2005 Balcan et al. 2008; Lavi and Swamy 2005] ). As was argued extensively in the literature (e.g., Nisan 2009, 2007; Sandholm and Boutilier 2006; Lahaie et al. 2005; Nisan and Segal 2005] ) demand queries are a natural way for agents to express their preferences. -Better results: if the valuation of the buyer is subadditive, it is known that polynomially many value queries cannot guarantee an approximation ratio of n 1 2 − even for optimization subject to a cardinality constraint [Dobzinski et al. 2005] 2 . Hence stronger oracles must be used to achieve reasonable approximation ratios.
A particular relevant paper is the recent [Badanidiyuru et al. 2012] , in which it is shown how to obtain "sketches" of valuation functions -short approximate representations -using demand queries 3 . See this paper for a discussion and for a separation between the power of demand queries and values queries in this setting.
A classical result in submodular optimization shows that the greedy algorithm provides an approximation ratio of e e−1 for optimization subject to a cardinality constraint [Fisher et al. 1978 ]. This is the best possible with a polynomial number of value queries Feige 1998 ]. We show that demand queries allow us to break the e e−1 barrier: Theorem: There exists a 9 8 -approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint that makes a polynomial number of demand queries. For the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular function subject to a knapsack constraint, for every constant > 0, there exists a ( 9 8 + )-approximation algorithm that makes a polynomial number of demand queries.
We start by presenting a natural linear program. The dual of the linear program has exponential many constraints but only polynomially many variables, so we show that the dual can be solved via the ellipsoid method, using a demand query as a separation oracle 4 . We show various structural properties of optimal solutions to the LP, e.g., there are at most two sets in their support. We now face an additional challenge: in general, none of these sets (or a part of them, in case they violate the cardinality constraint) provides a good enough approximation. The key step is showing that by taking one set and augmenting it using the other set we get a new combined set that does provide the specified approximation ratio.
Next, we consider the class of subadditive valuations. Previously, a constant-factor was known only for maximization subject to a cardinality constraint . We present the first constant-approximation algorithm for maximization subject to the more general knapsack constraint 5 . The best previously known algorithm for knapsack constraint achieved a ratio of O(log m) .
Theorem: There exists a 2-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing a subadditive function subject to a cardinality constraint that makes a polynomial number of demand queries. For the problem of maximizing a subadditive function subject to a knapsack constraint, for every constant > 0, there exists a (2 + )-approximation algorithm that makes a polynomial number of demand queries.
The first algorithm slightly improves over the best previously known algorithm for maximization subject to cardinality constraint which achieved a slightly worse factor of 2 + . Interestingly, the algorithms do not assume monotonicity, and in particular guarantee the specified approximation ratio also for nonmonotone submodular valuations (a class that received much attention recentlysee, e.g., [Lee et al. 2009; Kulik et al. 2011; Gharan and Vondrák 2011; Chekuri et al. 2011] ). In fact, we once again achieve better results than what possible with value queries: it is known that a 2.03-approximation algorithm for maximizing nonmonotone submodular function must use exponentially many value queries [Gharan and Vondrák 2011] .
We also show how to obtain purely combinatorial algorithms via a certain type of a natural "ascending auction", possibly with an additional augmentation step. An exciting direction is to analyze these auctions and similar ones from a more economic point of view, although we do not push this direction further in this paper.
Although the focus of this work is not incentives, our algorithms enable us to construct a "monotone estimator" (in the language of ) and improve the best known approximation ratio of a deterministic truthful mechanism for maximizing subadditive valuation subject to a knapsack constraint from O(log 3 m) to O(log 2 m) (the previous bound was achieved in ). Another testament to applicability of our bounds is that the algorithms for subadditive functions were already used in [Badanidiyuru et al. 2012 ] as a subroutine for obtaining sketches of subadditive valuations.
Are our bounds optimal? We provide an example with a matching integrality gap of 9 8 for optimizing monotone submodular valuations. For non-monotone submodular valuations we present an example with a matching integrality gap of 2. Moreover, we show that for subadditive valuations our results are optimal, even for fractionally subadditive valuations:
Theorem: Fix some constant > 0. Let A be a (possibly randomized) (2 − )-approximation algorithm for maximizing a fractionally subadditive function subject to a cardinality constraint. Then, A makes exponentially many demand queries.
Proving limits on the power of demand queries requires developing significant amount of novel machinery 6 . We start with some specific valuation v, and obtain a valuation v T by "planting" some bundle T of size k with high value. We would like to show that determining whether such planting occurred requires an exponential number of demand queries. The challenge is that a single demand query can verify whether the valuation is v T for many bundles T simultaneously. Nevertheless, we show that the power of a single demand query is limited: for every demand query there exists a set of items (relatively small but of significant size) that is contained in all bundles T that the demand query simultaneously verifies. This enables us to upper bound the number of bundles that can be simultaneously verified by a single demand query, and suffices to derive the theorem. We also use this technique to rule out an FPTAS for maximizing a submodular function subject to a knapsack constraint.
Open Questions. In this paper we initiated the systematic study of optimization with demand queries. Let us now mention several intriguing questions that we leave open. The first natural one is to determine the possible approximation ratio when the valuation of the buyer is submodular, both in the monotone and in the non-monotone cases. Currently, we do not know how to even rule out the possibility of exact algorithms for these cases, although we conjecture that such algorithms do not exist. It is also interesting to understand the possible approximation ratios using different constraints. Examples include optimizing submodular functions subject to matroid constraint [Fisher et al. 1978; Vondrák 2008] , multiple knapsacks [Kulik et al. 2009 [Kulik et al. , 2011 and their combination [Lee et al. 2009; Chekuri et al. 2011] . What is the approximation ratio possible if demand queries are available in all these settings? We make a first step in this direction by providing an O(k) approximation algorithm for optimizing subadditive function subject to k knapsack constraints. We do not know neither whether this is the optimal ratio possible nor how to construct good algorithms for the other settings.
Paper Organization. Section 3 presents the LP for the problem and proves some structural properties of optimal solutions. In Section 4 we give our 9 8 -approximation algorithms for submodular valuations. Section 5 provides approximation algorithms for subadditive valuations. We show that the algorithms for subadditive valuations are in fact optimal in Section 6. The proof that there is no FPTAS for submodular valuations subject to a knapsack constraint is also in that section.
PRELIMINARIES

Valuations and Problems
We study the following two problems 7 : in the maximization subject to cardinality constraint problem we are given a number k, and want to find the largest value set S, |S| = k. In the maximization subject to budget constraint problem we are given a 6 The most relevant lower bound that applies specifically to demand queries is that of Nisan and Segal [Nisan and Segal 2005] . However, the setting of [Nisan and Segal 2005] is much simpler, and their ideas do not seem to be applicable in our case. 7 We also consider some generalizations, which will be defined in the proper subsections.
budget B and a cost c i for each item i. The goal is to find the largest-value set S, such that Σ j∈S c j ≤ B. We sometimes use the name maximization subject to a knapsack constraint for this problem.
We consider this problem under various restrictions on the valuations. We say that v is submodular if for every S,
Notice that every submodular valuation is also subadditive, and every additive valuation is submodular.
Another type of valuations that we consider is fractionally subadditive (or XOS). A valuation is XOS if there exist additive valuations v 1 , . . . , v l such that v(S) = max i v i (S) (we say that i is a maximizing clause of S). Every XOS valuation is subadditive, every monotone submodular valuation is XOS, and there are subadditive valuations that are not XOS, and XOS valuations that are not submodular [Lehmann et al. 2001] .
We use the notation
For the problem of maximizing a function subject to budget constraint, we sometimes use the notation C(S) = Σ j∈S c j .
The set of bundles that achieve the max is called the demand set of the query. Our algorithms provide the guaranteed approximation ratio without making any assumption about which specific bundle is returned from the demand set. For lower bounds, as pointed out in [Nisan and Segal 2005] , some unnatural tiebreaking rules may supply unrealistic information about the valuation. Therefore, as in [Nisan and Segal 2005] , our lower bound assumes any tie-breaking rule that does not depend on the valuation, e.g., return the lexicographically-first bundle in the demand set.
Another type of well-studied query is value query: given a set S, return v(S). It is known [Blumrosen and Nisan 2009 ] that a value query can be simulated by polynomially many demand queries (but exponentially many value queries may be required to simulate a single demand query). This paper concentrates in designing algorithm with polynomially many demand queries, so we freely assume that we have access to value queries.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE LP
Our algorithms are based on finding good roundings of fractional solutions. These fractional solutions are obtained by solving a natural linear relaxation of our problems. The key ingredient is analyzing the structural properties of optimal fractional solutions: we give limits on the number of elements in the support, analyze their costs, and give precise formulas for the weights of the elements in the support. We note that all the results in this section hold for arbitrary set functions. The Submodularity or subadditivity of the functions are used only in rounding the fractional solutions in the next Sections.
The LP can be solved using demand oracles. Moreover, we show that there is a combinatorial method of obtaining solutions to the LP, using a process that can be viewed as an ascending auction.
The LP is presented for the more general case of maximization subject to a budget constraint (maximization subject to a cardinality constraint is a special case where for each item i, c i = 1 and B = k).
Maximize: S x S · v(S)
Subject to:
Although the LP has an exponential number of variables, we show that it can still be solved using a polynomial number of demand queries: PROPOSITION 3.1. The LP can be solved using a polynomial number of demand queries.
PROOF. Consider the dual of the primal LP:
We use the ellipsoid method to solve the dual LP and thus obtain a solution to the primal LP. For the ellipsoid method to work we need to implement a separation oracle that finds some set S that violates the constraint y · C(S) + z ≥ v(S). To do that, consider the demand query dq = y · (c 1 , . . . , c m ), and let T be the bundle that dq returns.
A key ingredient of our algorithms is the following structural property of the LP. 
Definition 3.2. A fractional solution is a strict solution if there are two variables
Consider now the other extreme case, where for each set S in the support of the solution we have that C(S) > B. In this case we show that there is a fractional solution with exactly one variable in the support:
. In this case we set S 1 = ∅. Observe that by setting
we get a strict fractional solution with value at least equal to the value of the optimal fractional solution.
The only case that is left to handle is the case where there are two sets with x S 1 , x S 2 > 0 and C(S 1 ) ≤ B and C(S 2 ) > B. We show a strict fractional solution that is optimal. By complementary slackness we have that z + y · C(S 1 ) = v(S 1 ) and z + y · C(S 2 ) = v(S 2 ). Solving for z and y we get z =
. Hence the value of the optimal fractional solution is
.
Consider now the strict fractional solution
. Its value is exactly the value of the optimal fractional solution:
Solving the LP via an Ascending Auction
We now present a combinatorial method of obtaining strict fractional solutions to the LP. An important advantage of this method is that it uses only uniform-price queries (unlike the previous LP-based approach that requires arbitrary demand queries). We make use of the following simple property of demand queries: 
PROOF. By the definition of demand query we have v(S
Adding the two inequalities and simplifying we get
such that S 2 is in the demand set in prices λ · (c 1 , . . . , c m ) and for every small enough δ > 0 we have that S 1 is in the demand set in prices (λ + δ) · (c 1 , . . . , c m ). We say that S 1 and S 2 are two boundary bundles.
Let us further explain the notion of boundary bundles. For simplicity, this paragraph considers only the simpler cardinality constraint. Consider some prices λ · (1, . . . , 1). When λ = 0, the most profitable bundle consists of all items. Lemma 3.4 implies that as the value of λ increases, the size of bundles in the demand set decreases (eventually, when λ is big enough, the demand set will be empty). The boundary is the specific λ for which the demand set in λ · (1, . . . , 1) contains only bundles that violate the cardinality constraint, but for (λ + ) · (1, . . . , 1) the demand set contains bundles that respect the cardinality constraint.
The boundary bundles (and λ) can be found by an ascending auction in which we continously 8 increase the value of λ and obtain a profit-maximizing bundle in the current prices. The boundary is the λ for which the prices λ · (c 1 , . . . , c m ) are the supremum of the points where supply exceeds demand. We were surprised to find that the boundary bundles define a high-value fractional solution (proof of this lemma can be found in the full version at [Badanidiyuru et al. 2011] 
-APPROXIMATION FOR MONOTONE SUBMODULAR VALUATIONS
As we have shown, any strict solution to the LP with cardinality constraint contains two bundles, a "large" bundle with more than k items, and a "small" bundle with at most k items. A natural approach for an approximation algorithm is to select the maximum of the following two bundles: the "small" bundle, or an high-value chunk of size k from the "large" bundle. Unfortunately, there are examples that show that this approach cannot provide an approximation ratio better than 2. Hence, our strategy is subtler: we start with the small bundle and grab as much value as we can from the large bundle. We show that this combined bundle provides an approximation ratio of 9 8 .
We also extend this algorithm to handle maximization subject to a knapsack constraint. Here the approximation ratio we get is slightly worse: 9 8 + . We enumerate over all sets of high-cost items, then use a variation of our algorithm for a cardinality constraint as an algorithm for instances with only low-cost items. We complement these results by presenting an instance with an integrality gap of 9 8 (in the full version at [Badanidiyuru et al. 2011] ), even for maximization subject to cardinality constraint. 
+ O( ))-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular valuation subject to a knapsack constraint that makes a polynomial number of demand queries, for any fixed > 0.
We start with the algorithm for the cardinality constraint. We first present the algorithm, then comment on how it can be efficiently implemented.
The Algorithm
(1) Obtain a strict solution to the LP:
As for the efficient implementation of the algorithm, we have already argued in Proposition 3.3 that an optimal and strict solution to the LP can be found with a polynomial number of demand queries. Alternatively, Step 1 can also be implemented combinatorially as an ascending auction: start with a price per item of 0 and increase it gradually. When supply exceeds demand, consider the boundary bundles, and obtain a strict solution as in Lemma 3.6. Steps 2 and 3 can be implemented using the following folklore lemma (see Lemma 4.5 for a proof of a more general setting).
LEMMA 4.2. Let v be a submodular valuation, S be some bundle, and let t ≤ |S| be some integer. Then, there exists a set S ⊆ S, |S | = t such that v(S ) ≥ t |S| v(S). In addition, S can be found using a polynomial number of value queries.
Step 2 follows immediately from Lemma 4.2.
Step 3 follows by observing that the marginal valuation v(·|S 1 ) is submodular too, and applying Lemma 4.2 again. We are left with proving the approximation ratio of the algorithm: 
PROOF. Recall that v(S |S
Rearranging and using v(S 2 ∪ S 1 ) ≥ v(S 2 ) (since v is monotone) we have:
We are finally ready to prove the approximation ratio:
where the second inequality is due to (1). It remains to bound the value of γ (the proof can be found in the full version at [Badanidiyuru et al. 2011] ):
A ( 9 8
+ )-Approximation Submodular Valuations Subject to a Knapsack Constraint
The Algorithm
Notice that if is constant then there are only polynomially many iterations. Since each iteration needs polynomially many demand queries, the total number of demand queries is polynomial too. We will use Lemma 4.5 to implement Steps (1d) and (1e) 
PROOF. We prove the existence of S t for t = |S| − 1. The lemma will then follow as it implies that we can find S 1 ⊆ S 2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ S |S|−1 ⊆ S |S| = S, where |S t | = t, and for each l,
. Now we will have that
Notice that given v(S l ) we can v(S l−1 ) by considering the l subsets of size l − 1 and taking the one with the highest value. We now prove the lemma for t = |S| − 1. We have that
where the inequality holds because v is submodular and has decreasing marginal utilities. In particular we have that for some item j,
e., v(S − {j}) ≥ C(S−{j}) C(S) v(S). Let S = S − {j}. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We only analyze one particular iteration, when L is the set of the 1 2 items with the highest costs in the optimal solution. Furthermore, let a 1 , . .., a |L| be some order on the items of L so that for every i, v(a i |{1, ...., a i−1 }) ≥ v(a i+1 |{1, ...., a i }) . Such order can be obtained by starting from the empty set and greedily taking the item from L with the highest marginal contribution that has not been taken yet. Let L = {a (1− )|L| , . . . a |L| }. Observe that by submodularity the value of the optimal unrestricted solution in M L,L ∪ T is at least (1 − )OP T , where OPT is the value of the optimal solution. Also notice that
Step (1d) note that for some S t we have by Lemma 4.5 that
Step (1d) follows.
Step (1e) follows by observing that the marginal valuation v L,L (·|S 1 ) is submodular too and applying Lemma 4.5 similar to Step (1d).
where γ showed to be at most 9 8 in Claim 4.4. Recall that we lost at most · OP T by discarding items in L . We therefore have that the value of the solution is at least
(1 − ) · OP T .
A 2-APPROXIMATION FOR SUBADDITIVE VALUATIONS
We show that there exists a 2-approximation algorithm for maximization subject to cardinality constraint. This is the best ratio achievable with a polynomial number of demand queries even if the valuation is XOS, as we show in Section 6. While this is only a slight improvement over the (2 + ) approximation algorithm for the setting of , we then show how to extend this algorithm to provide a (1 + k 1− )-approximation for maximization subject to k-knapsack constraints. In particular this implies that there exists a (2 + O( ))-approximation algorithm for maximization subject to a knapsack constraint (k = 1). Previously, the best bound was O(log n) .
Both algorithms provide the same approximation ratio also for non-monotone subadditive valuations, not just monotone ones. In the full version( [Badanidiyuru et al. 2011]) we show that when the valuation is non-monotone and submodular, then the integrality gap is 2. The second algorithm can be found in the full version at [Badanidiyuru et al. 2011] . We give here the first algorithm, which uses a simple rounding scheme.
The Algorithm
(1) Obtain a strict fractional solution x S 1 = α and
Notice that the above algorithm can be implemented with a polynomial number of demand queries.
LEMMA 5.2. Let A be the bundle that the algorithm outputs. Then,
PROOF.
where the first inequality holds by subadditivity v(
k , the fourth inequality uses x S 1 + x S 2 ≤ 1, and the last inequality holds since by the LP we have that x S2 |S 2 | ≤ k.
LOWER BOUNDS
A Tight Lower Bound for XOS Valuations
We show that our algorithms from Section 5 are essentially tight: an approximation ratio of 2− requires exponentially many demand queries. We note that proving bounds on the power of algorithms with demand queries turned out to be not an easy task, and in particular very different than showing lower bounds on the power of value queries. For example, when we consider value queries there are only finitely many value queries that we have to consider (no more than the number of subsets of M ), whereas there is an infinite number of demand queries we have to consider. The crux of our proof is to show that the power of any arbitrary demand query is limited in some formal sense, hence exponentially many demand queries are needed to distinguish between the case that the optimal value is 2, and between the case it is 1 + .
We note that that our bound holds also for randomized mechanisms, and in fact holds also for a the class of fractionally subadditive valuations, a strict subclass of subadditive valuations. In particular, fix some , γ > 0, and let k = m 1−γ . The theorem says that obtaining a 2 − approximation requires exponential number of demand queries. The following three families of additive valuations will be used in the proof:
(1) For every item j, define the valuation I j such that I j ({j}) = 1 and for every t = j, I j ({t}) = 0. PROOF. Specifically, we show that any deterministic algorithm must make in expectation the specified number of demand queries to determine if the valuation is v ∅ , when the valuation is chosen uniformly at random from the set {v ∅ } ∪ T :|T |=k v T . Yao's principle delivers the lemma now.
We use the following definition: 
Since S is in the demand set and G T is its maximizing clause, for each j ∈ S, p j ≤ 2 k (otherwise S − {j} is more profitable than S, and thus S is not in the demand set).
Reorganizing we have that 
The key observation is that if v T is not covered by dq, then the demand set of dq is identical in v ∅ and v T . In particular, the only information that executing dq adds is either to determine that the valuation is some specific v T (in case v T is covered by dq) or to claim that the valuation is not any of the v T 's that are covered by dq. However, to determine whether the valuation is v ∅ , we need to rule out all possible values of T . The heart of the proof is the following claim: CLAIM 6.5 . Fix a demand query dq = (p 1 , ..., p m ) . The number of bundles that dq covers is at most
PROOF. We upper bound the number of valuations V T that dq covers by describing a set L of items of size at most |L| ≤ 4k with the property that for every v T that is covered by dq, |L ∩ T | > k 100 . The number of these bundles is at most:
We now describe a process that constructs the set L. After that, we prove that L is indeed of the specified size.
(1) Let L 0 = ∅, T = {T |v T is covered by dq}, and i = 0.
(c) Let S T i be a set in the demand set of dq in v T that is maximized in the clause
(e) Let T = {T |v T is covered by dq and
We now show that |L| ≤ 4k . Specifically, we show that if the number of iterations t is more than 4 then the profit of L is at least 2. This means the demand set does not contain bundles of size at most k at all, since their value is at most 2. Hence dq covers no valuation v T (i. We would like to bound the number of iterations t the process goes on. By our discussion above, the process must stop before the profit of L is bigger than 2 (i.e., v ∅ (L) − Σ j p j > 2):
where the second to last inequality follows since for each i, |S i | ≤ |T i | ≤ k. Therefore for the profit of L to be at most 2 it must hold that t ≤ 4 . Recall that any iteration we are adding to L at most k items. Therefore |L| ≤ t · k ≤ 4k .
Claim 6.5 implies Lemma 6.2: the total number of bundles of size k is Therefore, until we rule out at least half of the bundles, any additional demand query finds T with probability at most 
Ruling Out an FPTAS for Submodular Maximization Subject to a Knapsack Constraint
We show that there is no FPTAS for the problem of optimizing a submodlar function subject to a knapsack constraint (an FPTAS is a (1 + )-approximation algorithm that the number of demand queries it makes is poly(m, 1 )). queries we find T with probability at most o(1).
